Carlos Del Toro
           cell: (331) 007-5782
           work: (376) 765-3878
           work: (376) 765-4725
           net: carlos_asesorparlamentario@hotmail.com

                                               JUDGEMENT REGARDING PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

                   582/2013   BOARD 11

WHEREAS,in order to resolve the action for relief fromamparo582/2013:

andRESULTING IN:

1º.    In the brief presented 13th March 2013, in the Clerk’s Office of the District Courts of the Common Parts of Administrative Matters and Labor in the State of Jalisco,PAUL EAST, by his own right, brought suit for an indirect writ ofamparo against the Constitutional City Government of Chapala, Jalisco and other authorities,by actions that he made consisting of:

“IV. -  Proceedings claiming Protection of Civil Rights.  1º To the Constitutional Government of the city of Chapala, Jalisco he opposed their illegal omission to authorize to the subdivision Chula Vista, located within the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, the foregoing with the motive that the ChulaVista Homeowners Association, A.C.  provides these public services without authorization, in a mediocre manner and performs billings in an uncompromising way outside of all legality…..2º  To the same Constitutional City Government of Chapala, Jalisco, his Honor the  President of the Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, and the Minister in Charge of the Executive Department of Chapala, Jalisco, he opposes their illegal omission to legalize and formalize the provision of public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection , transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, the foregoing with the motive that the ChulaVista Homeowners Association, A.C. provides these public services without authorization, in a mediocre manner and performs billings in an uncompromising way outside of all legality…..3º. To … Chula Vista …A.C. he opposes the illegal imposition of fees corresponding to the provision of  public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection , transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, by reason that said fees are not found attached to legality, attached, much less to the Municipal Revenue Law for the State of Jalisco, as well as he opposes the illegal provision of public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, with motive that the corresponding concession is lacking and the manner of providing services is done in an unsatisfactory manner, without being attached to the Law or any standard of provision of the listed services, opposing them also for their failure to send and deliver a receipt within the expected formalities of the Law, that protects the payment of public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment.---4º To himself, his Honor the President of the Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco and to the Minister in Charge of the Executive Department of the Municipal Council of Chapala, Jalisco, he opposes their  illegal omission  to ISSUE A CALL to grant the concession for provision of public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection , transport and final disposition of same; streets, parks and gardens and their equipment; the foregoing in the terms of number 104 of the  GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISNTRATION LAW OF THE STATE OF JALISCO, the foregoing in virtue of the illegal and unsatisfactory manner in which the ChulaVista Association is found in providing the named services.”

2º. – The demand of protection of civil rights in question, was taken in turn for the knowledge to this First District Court  of Administrative Matters and Labor in the State of Jalisco, whose Office Holderpronounced the decision on 15 March 2013 that he flatly rejected the same, under the argument that the grounds for inadmissibility had been foreseen and updated  in section XII number 73 of the Civil Rights Protection Law.

3º.—Dissenting with the said determination, he lodged a beseecher guarantee appeal for review, which was taken in turn by the Third Court Composed of Several Judges   in Administrative Material of the Third Circuit, which was registered with number 161/2013. Later, in a resolution of 15th August 2013, it determined to partially revoke the judicial decree appealed against, due to the effect that this jurisdictional organ disregarded consideration of the updates for the grounds for inadmissibility earlier pointed out, with respect to the proceedings demanded to the authorities indicated as those responsible (except the claims to the ChulaVista Homeowners Association, A.C., only in that concerning the provision of services and imposing fees.)

4º.—So, once testimony of the resolution of merit was received, the Head of this jurisdictional organ, in a writ of 26 August 2013, ordered the admittance of the demands of the Civil Rights proceeding in question, following the guidelines set by the Higher Court, and registered with number 582/2013: to ask that the report be justified to the authorities indicated as responsible; to give to the assigned Agent of the Public Ministry of the Federation the legal intervention that corresponds and to designate the day and hour to hold a constitutional hearing, in which to relieve the tone of the preceding judicial decree which forms an integral part of this judgment.

TIM PLEASE NOTE: (things highlighted by Carlos in pencil will be BOLD and underlinedaltho’

          some bold  a/o    underlined are from the original document)

CONSIDERING:

1. – This First Court in Administrative Matters and Labor of the State of Jaliscois legallycompetent to resolve the present action for proceedings for relief, in conformity with those set down in articles 103, section 1, and 107, section VII, of Constitutional Policy of the United Mexican States; section 1, 36, and 114, section II, of the Civil Rights Law; and 52, section IV, of the Organic Law of Judicial Power of the Federation.

…… unnecessary paragraphs for your purposes omitted………

In that sense, in a comprehensive reading of the demands in the civil rights proceeding, it warns that the demanded actions in the present constitutional instance establish:

a)  The omission of the City Council, of the Municipal President, and the Head Commissioner of the Secretary General, all of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco, to award to the Subdivision of ChulaVista, located in the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, the public service of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, in conformance with articles 37 and 47 of the Government and Public Municipal Administration Law of the State of Jalisco.

b)  By the same form, the omission to formalize and legalize the provision of these municipal public services to the cited Subdivision.

c) Then, the omission to issue a call, in the terms stipulated by number 104 of the Government and Public Municipal Administration Law of the State of Jalisco, to the effect of granting the concession of the mentioned public services to private parties.

d)To the ChulaVista Homeowners Association, A.C., their omission to issue and deliver to the membersof the said subdivisiona receipt for payment received for the public municipal services provided by the said association, bringing together the applicable legal requirements.

III.The Association, on behalf of the Government, the Municipal President, and the Secretary General, all of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco, on having jointly produced its justified report (files 99 to 103) denied the existence of the writs that are claimed in the lawsuit demanding the guarantees of petition (specified ina) b) and c) of the previous considerations).

On his part, the petitioner for civil rights protection did not contribute an effective element of conviction tending to detract from the denials noted. In effect, with the documents which he offered in front of the present civil action of guarantees, consisting of certified copies of property transfers file 112359, of 13 June 1995; of the public writing number 2,675, of 6 June 1995, executed in good faith before Notary Public number 4 of Chapala, Jalisco; and of an appraisal of 3 January 1995; in the best of cases, it certifies the acquisition and ownership of property rights over the apartment located within the condominium located on the streetPaseo de Jacarandas number 27-B, in the Subdivision of Chula Vista, located within the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco.However, these documents are not sufficient to detract from the denials expressed by the indicated responsible authorities in this conflict and to demonstrate the existence of the proceedings of these claims, that is, the same ones incurred in the omissions which he reproaches in this constitutional instance,to grant to the Subdivision of ChulaVista,located in the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, the public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, in conformance with articles 37 and 47 of the Law of Government and Public Municipal Administration of the State of Jalisco; likewise, to formalize and legalize the provision of those municipal public services to the cited Subdivision; and, to comply with the stipulation by number 104 of the Government and Public Municipal Administration Law of the State of Jalisco, in the sense to issue a call to the effect of granting the concession of those mentioned public services to private parties.

In addition, the non-existence of omissions attributed to the responsible authorities of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco corroborate themselves with the examination of the documentary evidence offered by these to render its justified report, consisting of certified copies of the agreement by which the delivery of the municipal public services of the Subdivision of ChulaVista,  in the Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco is formalized, executed 26 January 1971, betweenFraccionaria Galicia, S.A…… and the Subdivision of ChulaVista Homeowners Association, S.A.; of the official letter 833, derived from file 40, of  7 August 1961; of the diverse official letters 229 and 656, derived from file 40/1969, of  22 January and 23 April, both in 1969; and of the official letter 47, derived from file 40/1970, of 18 January 1970, all of the foregoing official letters undersigned by the Municipal President and the Secretary, both of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco.  Documents which grant full evidentiary proof, in conformity with that stipulated by articles 129, 133, 197, and 202 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedures with supplementary application to the Civil Rights Law.

Of the analysis of the documents previously described, their value is enhanced relative to the following precedents:

By means of court order 833, derived from the file 40, of 07 August 1971, The Municipal President and Secretary, both of the Government of Chapala, Jalisco, offered authorization to the legal entityFraccionaria Galicia, S.A., C.V., to carry out (as in “form”) the Subdivision that it named “Chulavista”, located to the west of Chapala, Jalisco and across from the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, of that Municipality.

Later, via court order 229, of 22 January 1969, derived from file 40/1969, The Municipal President and the Secretary, both of the Government of Chapala, Jalisco, made known to the Subdivision ChulaVista Homeowners Association, A.C., their inability to take charge of the municipal public services of that subdivision, for the reasons exhibited there.

Therefore, by means of court order 656, of 23 April 1969, derived from file 40/1969, the said municipal authorities communicated to …Chulavista ....A.C. that they were in agreement  to confer charge (to them) of the municipal services of that subdivision.

***Subsequently, by means of court order 47, derived from file 40/1970of 18 January 1970, the Municipal President and Secretary, both of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco, made known to the mentioned homeowners association that they were finding it impossible to continue providing the corresponding public municipal services, and they authorized the concession of same to….ChulaVista..A.C… with the objective that they would be taken over by the  subdivision administration.

***Finally, the company Fraccionaria Galicia, S.A. de C.V. and the Chula Vista…A.C.  executed anagreement 26 January 1971, in which  they formalized the delivery of municipal public servicesinto (the hands of) …ChulaVista… in the municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, under the terms there stipulated.

Well, in light of the prior connection of precedents, it is incontrovertible that the omissions claimed by the plaintiff to the responsible authorities of the Constitutional Gov’t of Chapala, Jalisco do not exist, like the argument in his demand of guarantees.

In effect, with respect, about the omission to authorize to …ChulaVista, located in the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, the public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, in conformance with articles 37 and 47 of the Government and Public Municipal Administration Law of the State of Jalisco; as well as to legalize and formalize the provision of those public services to the cited subdivision, it should be noted that, as indicated in the certified copies of court orders 229 and 656, derived from file 40/1969 of 22 January and 23 April, both in 1969; and of court order 47, derived from file 40/1970, of 18 January 1970, all undersigned by the Municipal President and Secretary, both of the Constitutional Government of Chapala,the concession of the public municipal services previously described, were already authorized to …..Chula Vista…A:C:… which, in turn, was formalized legally, by means of the agreement executed 26 January 1971, between the businessFracc. Galicia, S.A. de C.V. (responsible for the construction of the Fracc. Chula Vista and originally in charge of covering the public municipal services in the same (Chula Vista), by authorization of the same Gov’t of Chapala, Jalisco), and the…ChulaVista, A.C.

So, it is clear that the responsible authorities of the Constit’l Gov’t of Chapala, Jalisco did not incur the claimed omissions, in the face of the circumstances that the concession of the public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, was formally and legally authorized to the …ChulaVista..A.C. of Chapala, Jalisco,  who actually is directly charged to administer that subdivision as provider of said services.

On the other hand, it does not go unnoticed that, on examination of the body of evidence that makes up the present court order of guarantees, it is not detected that the Constit’l Gov’t of Chapala, Jalisco had issued a call, in terms stipulated by article 104 of the Government and Municipal Public Administration Law of the State of Jalisco, to authorize the provision of public municipal services to …Chula Vista..A.C…, nevertheless, it should be noted that it does not detract from the denial of said claimant proceeding, if when bearing in mind the noted omission (to issue a call) is not attributable to the responsible municipal authorities.

To illustrate the previous, the content of article 104 of the Government and Municipal Public Administration Law of the State of Jalisco, previously invoked, is transcribed (following):

“Article 104. For  the authorization of goods and public municipal services, when the Government does not grant them to legal persons with civil and local representation,it should issue a call written by the Municipal President and the officer in charge of the Secretariat of the Government, that should be published in the Municipal Gazette or in the official means of disclosure provided for in the applicable regulation, as well as by whichever publicity the Municipal Government deems best.”(Emphasis added by the court in the Spanish document, and by Carlos)

As you can see from the previously transcribed number, the legal obligation of the Municipal President and the Head of the Government Secretariat, to issue a call  in order to grant a concession of goods and public municipal services, appears only and exclusively when the said concessionis given to a person (actual or moral) different from one with functions of civil or local representation (homeowners association).

In this tone, yes, as it remains accredited in rulings, the concession to provide public services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, wasformally and legally authorized to the …ChulaVista..A.C. of Chapala, Jalisco, who actually is directly charged to administer that subdivision as provider of said services, is it clear that the Municipal President and The Head Commissioner of the Secretary General, all of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco, did not have the obligation to issue a call of merit for the effect of giving legal validity to that concession. Therefore, it is considered that said omission is not an act attributable to the responsible municipal authorities.

In those conditions, in the presence of lack of demonstration of the existence of the claimed actions to the Municipal Government, the Municipal President, and to the functionary in charge of the Secretariat, all of the Constitutional Gov.t of Chapala, Jalisco,the judgment must be annulled with respect to the same, with the aid  of that stipulated by article 74, section IV, of the Civil Rights Law, which says:

“Article 74.- The discontinuance comes: […]IV. When the records of the ruling appear to clearly demonstrate that no claimant proceeding exists, or when there is no proof of its existence in the courtroom hearing referred to in article 155 of this law. […]”.

On this matter, thesis number VI.2o.32K is applicable, issued by the Second Court Composed of Several Judges of the Sixth Circuit, searchable in the Weekly Judicial Paper of the Federation and its Gazette, of the Ninth Period, Volume III, June 1996, page 964, whose heading and text literally establish:

“CLAIMANT PROCEEDING, DENIED, DOES NOT REQUIRE A REASON. The authority responsible to deny the existence of the proceeding that is attributed to him does not have to justify or reason out his denial.”

           …………………………unnecessary text omitted…………………..

IV. …Chula Vista..A.C. failed to render its justifiable report, in spite of being legally and appropriately summoned, as can be seen from the record (page 127 of the ruling), and in consequence, with the aid of that stipulated by article 149, third paragraph, of the Civil Rights Law, that the ruling being claimed  (specified in subsectiond)in the second consideration of the present mistake is presumptively certain.

V.-  The study of the original proceeding for a writ of relief, is of public order and preferential to the base subject of the constitutional question posed, conforming with that stipulated in the last paragraph of article 73 of the Civil Rights Law.

Well then this Federal Superior Court Judge considers that, with respect to the responsible authority indicated as …Chula Vista..A.C…it updates the grounds of inadmissibility foreseen in section XVIII of the referred article 73, with relation to number 11 of the Civil Rights Law.

Nevertheless prior to giving the reasons as to why this Superior Court Judge considers the grounds of merit updated, it is necessary to carry out the following annotations:

The beseecher of guarantees, in the historical records of his civil rights lawsuit calls himself owner of the apartment located within the condominium situated on the streetPaseo del las Jacarandas number 27-B, in … ChulaVista… located within the village of San Antonio Tlayacapan, Municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, by which reason he indicates he considers himself to be a member of the described association, known as “…ChulaVista…, A.C.”, for which reason the legal effects endure of the corporation agreement or modifications to the by-laws, without being an obstacle to the foregoing, which do not increase the approval belonging to the non-conforming body.

In addition, is should be noted that, as it can be seen in the contents of the public writing number 49 and 9,575, of 11 February 2013,  executed before Notary Public number one of Chapala, Jalisco, at which same accompanied The President  and legal representative of …. Chula Vista….A.C…., by means of the writing presented in the Clerk’s Office of the Parts of this Court 21 October 2013,here the plaintiff, PAUL EAST, was made part of the active Board of the said homeowners association, in the role of Manager. A circumstance which strengthens that argued in the foregoing lines.

On this matter, it brings up a collation of articles 172, 181 and 182 of the Civil Code of the State of Jalisco, whose texts stipulate:

“Article 172.-  When various persons agree to meet, in a manner that is not entirely transitory, in order to reach an agreement that is not prohibited by law and that does not have a preponderantly economic role, they constitute an association.”

“Article 181. -  The general assembly will resolve…. I. About the admission and exclusion of associates¸ …. II. About the anticipated dissolution of the association or about its extension for more time than fixed in the by-laws;…III. About the naming of director or directors when none have been named in the constitutional writing;… IV. About the revocation of appointments made; and---V. About the rest of any matters are entrusted within the by-laws.”

“Article 182.-  The agreements made in the general assemblies are obligatory for all associates, even when they  might have voted against the same.----- An associate who claims an irregularity in the summons or notification to attend a meeting, or who might be occupied with matters not contained in the notice of a meeting, could lodge a complain before the resident judge of the association, that the agreement made in the same (meeting) is not applicable to that person.-----The resolution in this case only would apply to the affected person who pled his case; but when it had been agreed about an assessment or disposal of the fixed assets of the association, of its anticipated dissolution, of a fusion or a split with other associations, he would have to sue to demand the said agreement be annulled.------ Whomever claims to annul the agreements of an assembly could ask the judge, in a provisional manner,  to order the suspension of same, always granting to the plaintiff a guarantee of sufficient time to respond to the damages and losses caused by such a measure, in the event he does not have a favorable resolution to his  claims. The indicated guarantee could be increased or decreased if the conditions change that were taken into consideration to settle the matter.”

In the terms of the transcribed numbers, the association is a plurilateral contract by which those who constitute it are legally obliged to the permanent legal fulfillment, ordinary and not prohibited by law and without a preponderantly economic character, by which it is constituted as a legal entity, provided with denomination, assets, and its own (governing) body.

In this regard, the integral parties of the association are motivated by the same interest and their  services are not conflicting, by reason of and bearing in mind the plurality, of the execution and obligations of the parties, that is to say, the payment of their respective contributions constitute the platform or the premise in order to carry out a later activity,  it being that these subsequent acts must satisfy the purpose of the contract, counting on and enjoying the same type of rights, whose differentiation could be given from a quantitative, not qualitative perspective.

Another characteristic of the association, in its plurilateral function, is formed by the opening, by which they are provided the means to lead to a permanent membership offer to new parties, meanwhile satisfying the conditions determined by their inclusion and, in turn, to count on the possibility to desist in their participation, as well as to not have the need to reform the original contract in order to let others participate or join or withdraw or separate themselves from the same.

Also, another distinctive fact isset up so that the satisfaction of a provision does not have the effect of exhausting the fulfillment of the purpose of the association, since it requires diverse indefinite acts; as well, the expression of the will of the parties is continuous and permanent, which is transcendent because of the will that the relationship exists and persists.

The main organ of the association is the general assembly, whose powers are described in the legal norm and in the corresponding by-laws and their decisions will be obligatory for everyone, even when someone is not in agreement with that decision, then in such case he should turn to legal channels in order to challenge the related action.

In addition to this, the association by-laws legally constitute the set of standards or rules for the corresponding entity, and from which are derived the rights and obligations of the parties or members.

In this context, the role of the association is defined based on the legal nature of the association, and, for this, the provisions of the proceedings of the constitution and by-laws should be noted.

That is, in accordance with the contents of the documents relative to the preceding paragraphs, it  is noted that the association named responsible, has as its objective, among others, to perform those actions necessary in order to satisfy the common needs of the members in terms of services, whose influence is determined by the perimeter that encloses the subdivision, so, this is the main relevant point in order to grant the status of member to a person in order that they may acquire a property within the area of the named entity, so that regardless of who owns the property, just by having that ownership, they will have the right to receive subdivision services.

**On the other hand, with the documentary history of the legal rulings, it can be noted bymeans of official letter 47, derived from file 40/1970 of 19 January 1970, the Municipal President and Secretary, both of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco, informed the mentioned membership association that they found themselves unable to continue to provide corresponding municipal public services andauthorized the concession of the same to “…ChulaVista..A.C….” with the objective that the subdivision management would take charge of them. Later, the companyFrac. Galicia, s.a. de C.V. and the Chula Vista Ass’c…held a meeting 26 January 1971 in which they formalized the delivery of municipal public services toFrac.Chula Vista, in the municipality of Chapala, Jalisco, under the terms there stipulated.**(Carlos has this paragraph heavily noted by hand.)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, you must not lose sight that the responsible (entity) is an association of neighbors, and not a decentralized public municipal institution, by which reason, it does not have the role of  responsible authority for the results of the judgment of theamparo.

The foregoing is maintained any time that analysis of the evidence provided, but it is noted that while it is true the association has administrative capabilities, and the provision  of municipal services of drinking water, drainage, sewers, public lighting, cleanliness, garbage collection, transport and final disposition of same; maintenance of streets, parks and gardens and their equipment, all is by means of a contractual relationship, since the entity that emerged from the constitution as an A.C. was considered as anauxiliary in the social participation in the municipality, within the limits of thecolonia in which it belongs, in that vein, in the particular case, it must be understood that as an entity it does not belong to or is it integral to that which is outside of the municipality, and assists it (the municipality) in the provision of the municipal services, because this is the role that stems from its constitution.

This, if in noting that it must conform to number 115 of the Constitution, the provision of municipal services has to correspond to the original manner of the municipality, nevertheless, the said entity could rely on other persons who could assist in the satisfaction of these necessities.

In other words, municipalities have the ability to provide their services by themselves orby means of other persons who comply with the regulatory requirements for this purpose, because without counting on these assignments, it might cause dissatisfaction regarding the services in question to the detriment of the community.

Under this perspective, the provision of those municipal services can be carried out by the association named responsible, and this, by its legal nature, is a contract in the described terms, of that which forms part of the claimant’s (case) and  because of this the relationship is between private parties.

So, because the described relationship is not between and authority and a governed (one), but that the underlying link is only a voluntary collaboration between the members of the association, that is the reason and the essence of its constitution, then this constitutes the legal safe-conductby which the members can obtain satisfaction, among others, of the municipal services.

In such context, even in the assumption that the association counts on the ability to suspend provision of services, for lack of payment of fees or if they prove circumstances which merit same, or, in case of an investigation it does not issue corresponding payment receipts for payment of those municipal services previously described, this in no way has the effect of providing to the user of a fundamental right under the perspective of an authority by mean of the effects of theamparo,in fact every time it is in the presence of a logical and legal consequence of not complying with the obligations of a contract, then it must be remembered that the fees are the instrument by which the common necessities or municipal services are satisfied.

Therefore, in kind, in order to move forward, one is not in the presence of an authoritative act for effects of theamparo, but only in the hypothesis of breach of an obligation whose origin and support obeys the relationship that had been between the dissidents and the civil association, due to the non-existence of a relationship from above to a subordinate (one) with an individual, then the act in question is not unilateral and so the obligation emerges as well as is accepted, in an express or implied form, that in order to join the association in the quality of member to buy a property in the area,  one is under the influence of that zone.

Neither has it the characteristic of being an imperative act, as long as the voluntary will of the majority prevails in taking obligatory decisions of the association members, so it turns out that this corresponds to the very essence of the entity and these decisions are instrumental in carrying out the purpose for which it (association) was formed.

This is not a coercive act since even and when it can result in the suspension of delivery of services, or, as in the case of an investigation, it does not issue corresponding payment receipts for payment for those municipal public services provided by said civil association, it should be noted that under no circumstance it should come to the extreme of the use of public force to attain compliance of the obligations born from the beginning of the corresponding plurilateral contract, and nor does the said characteristic mean that the service provider must go to jurisdictional bodies in order to demand such a circumstance, then, in this type of legal relations the omission to send receipts material to the incidental lawsuit only and exclusively in the efficacy of the contractual relationship existing between the dissidents and the A.C.

By virtue of the entailed reference, the claimant’s action does not create, no does it modify nor extinguish the rights and obligations because they are decreed in the same contract and needed in order to meet the operative activities of the association.

The thesis of jurisprudence is applicable P./J. 92/2001, of the Full Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, seen in Book XIV, July 2001, page 693, of the Ninth Edition of the Weekly Judicial  Paper of the Federation and its Gazette, which establishes:

“POTABLE WATER. WHEN THE STATE PROVIDES THE SERVICE BY MEANS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTS OF ACCESSION, THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THAT OF SUPERIOR TO SUBORDINATE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN AN AUTHORITY AND A GOVERNED, BUT (IS) A RELATIONSHIP OF VOLUNTARY COORDINATION BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE PRIVATE PARTY.  To constitute the delivery of potable water the provision of a public service by the State, as a means for achieving the end, it is in the general interest that it be carried out while holding a meeting about an administrative contract of accession, in which the obligations and compensations between the parties are stipulated, and where the service provider and the beneficiary acquire reciprocal rights and obligations, under conditions fixed by the provider, since the legal relationship existing between the provider and the user of the service do not correspond to the entailed  guarantee established in article 14 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, that is, to that existing between an authority and a governed, but rather between the voluntary coordination and correspondence between the service provider of water delivery and the individual, and even when the provision of the mentioned public service is subject to a counterclaim, consisting of the payment of an amount of money proportional to the service received, when that is not covered, it will the provider reason the same legal faculty to exercise suspension of same, the action which, being a consequence of failure to pay, does not require that  it should comply with the legal guarantee referred to in article 16  of the same Federal Constitution, since the suspension of the service is not an action of authority that should be founded and motivated, but rather the result of the exercise of a faculty which it exercises when non-fulfillment of the contract occurs. In these conditions it is undisputable that the exercise of this faculty by the service provider may suspend the delivery of potable water to the users, previously cautioned in cases of lack of payment, or when unauthorized derivations or a use different from the agreement are verified, in accordance with those stipulated in the contract for provision of services, not implying the user be deprived of life, liberty, ownership, possessions, or rights, because what happens is a logical and legal consequence of the failure to comply with the contract of delivery of water; that’s why the service provider does not have to turn to the courts to in order to demand fulfillment of the contract, seeing as, as a rule, in this type of judicial adherence relations it is established that if payment for service is not covered, it will be suspended, subject to the opportunity the user has to fulfill payment, when giving warning that (the user) could find himself under suspension. Moreover, while the non-payment or deviation or unauthorized use of the water bring about the consequence of suspension of service, that cannot furnish the hypothesis of taking justice into one’s own hand or to exercise violence to reclaim one’s right, prohibited in number 17 of the Magna Carta, that always says  suspension derives from non-fulfillment of the delivery  contract and succession and finds its foundation in the law relative to this subject.

           --------------------------unnecessary text omitted-----------------------------

With things as they are, for the same reasons set forth and with the aid of the considerations of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, in the case under study, it grants privilege to the contractual relationship derived from claimant’s proceedings, and, in this power, the claimant’s proceedings are not under the authority over the legal effects of the writ of relief.

From the foregoing, it should be noted that the claimed omission (of issuing the receipts in question in accordance with the law) arises from a contractual relationship of a civil nature, especially since the responsible association does not have the character of a decentralized municipal organism, then, as we will see later, this role is only granted by law or by decree and not by a voluntary action between the contracting parties.

As pointed out in the above, it is necessary to transcribe articles 1º, section 1, 11 and 73, section XVIII, of the Civil Rights Law, whose texts establish:

“Article 1. –The action for relief has as its objective the resolution of all controversy it brings with it:-------1. By laws or legal proceedings of authority that violate individual guarantees;…”.

“Article 11. – It is the responsible authority that dictates, proclaims, publishes, orders, executes  or tries to execute the law  or the writ of relief”.

“Article 73. – The writ of relief is inadmissible:….---XVIII. – In all other cases when inadmissibility results from any legal disposition……….”.

The reproduced articles serve to maintain that in order to consider that a writ of relief is not the authority for legal effects of judgments of guarantees, because the same was gestated from the purpose of a coordinating relationship, according to which the entity acted on an equal legal footing in order to have its origin of not fulfilling its obligations as an associate, it has with such association, to whom it attributes the character of authority and which culminates in writs of relief.

With things as they are, it is advisable to define the scope of the text of the transcribed articles, those which advise that the writ of relief is proper against laws or acts of authority which are deemed in violation of individual guarantees; moreover, it establishes the character of the responsible authority, as soon as that entity is conferred with (the right to) dictate, promulgate, publish, order, execute or try to execute whichever law or determined action; meanwhile that the last of the referred precepts only state the possibility of setting up the consideration of  diverse illegality in those listed in the same article 73; then the same can find support in various legal devices or in the proper jurisprudence.

However, in order to define when it is in the presence of an authoritative proceeding under the effects of a writ of relief and to be subject matter of a study in a constitutional headquarters, the exhibited brings with it a collation by the Full Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, in a writ of relief in revision 1195/92, in whose part pertinent to the third part under consideration, showed:

“… From a State of law we are passing to a social State of law, in which the growth of collectivity and concomitantly of the problems and necessities of the same, give rise to a growing intervention of the public entity in various activities, both of provision of services such as production, and commercialization of products. In this sense, we forewarned in the decade of the eighties profound constitutional changes that gave rise to the rectorialcall of the State in economic matters,….. Consequently the state structure was modified and grew, specifically in the scope of Executive Power, in whose bosom grew the so-called semi-official state administration, formed by decentralized organs and companies with state participation, which undoubtedly escaped the concept of authority established in the related jurisprudence.--- In  this way, the generalized application of criteria, in fact leads to the defenselessness of those being governed, whether considered individually or collectively,  then these bodies in their proceedings, with independence from the direct requirements that the public power could have, or not, could, with foundations of a legal standard, issue unilateral actions through which they create, modify, or  annul on or before,  judicial situations which affect their legal sphere.---That is to say, the said entities could dictate acts that affect the judicial sphere of individuals, in and of itself in a unilateral manner, that is, without needing to turn to the judicial organs and  the consensus of the will of the affected (person), which implies the exercise of decisive faculties that are attributed to them in the law, and therefore constitute an executive power, an administrative authority whose performance may not be waived and never runs out, and therefore, if they are translated into true authoritative actions of a public nature they are the source of this authority.---In this sense, it is essential the clarify that the thesis (of opinion) occupying us cannot be actually applied in an indiscriminate manner but must consider the particularities of the case. The criteria must serve as a basein order to define the cases that are in the presence of anauthoritative proceeding, it must refer not so much to the direct requirement of public power and judicial nature from whence it is issued,but to the nature of the proceeding itself. --- In this line of interpretation, the superior court judge concerning the writ of relief,in order to establish if whomever is assuming the authority for the legal effects of theamparomust first and foremostpay attention to the normal legal standard in order to examine if they have the power or not, to take decisions or dictate resolutions that affect, unilaterally, the legal sphere of the interested (party), and whether it may already be required through the use of public force, or through other authorities that arrange it.--- These ideas have already been noted in diverse judgments by this National Supreme Court of Justice. By way of example, one must quote the following:---In theamparo under review number 3996/34, brought about by Julia Campos Otero, against actions of the Private Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic, the Second Tribunal, after alluding to the judgment pronounced in theamparo brought by Marcolfo F. Torres, which establishes the first precedent of classical jurisprudence relative to the concept of authority for the purposes of constitutional judgment, which has been outlined in advance, expressed the following:---“An opinion of the Court must precisely define even more concepts, finding that the criteria that must normally serve to define which cases are in the presence of an authoritative action, must refer to the very nature of such actions, those which can be, following the previously noted doctrine, a resolution that affects the individuals or acts of execution with the same characteristics, arising,  one or the other, from State Organs, inside or outside of their legal powers. From this point of view, it must be concluded that, independently of whether, in general terms, the Private Secretary of the citizen president of  the Republic has, or not, the character of an authority, in those terms of the law that regulate this official unit, in the present if case the proceeding of claim constitutes a decision, and the threat of the corresponding execution, put that it is clear from the documents of the records, the noted office looked to an official notice dated 2 June 1934, in which it says that in virtue of the violation of the fifth clause of the related rental contract  being fully proven,the expiration of the same is administratively declared,and in a subsequent communication, on 25 June of the same year, it says that for not having proven compliance with the stipulations of the same contract, this gives reason for termination and it grants a time period of 40 days preceding the vacating of the site; and in the written allegations, presented by the claimant before the Court, it settles that the person in charge of receipts  for the Bosque de Chapultepec, responsible for launching the charge against him, presented himself without bringing either an order or a written mandate by af competent authority and ordered that they broke the seals found located on the doors of the rented kiosk and that 20 subordinate (employees) under his orders removed all the merchandise and things they found in the  mentioned place. In the terms of the first of the mentioned communications, it can be see without any doubt, thatthe acts that he claims have the character of authoritative acts for the effects of the amparo, given that the administrative affirmation of the expiration of a contract, is a typical act of authority, and also is a requirement made regarding the handing over of a site offered  for rent. So, it should be estimated that those actions have a place in an amparo trial and in such power, revoking and staying, one must examine the merits of the constitutional question suggested.”(Judicial Conferenceof the Federation, Fifth Period, Tome XLV, pages 5037 and 5038). --- In this case, it is noted that the Second Chamber, in clarifying the concepts told in the indicated precedent, alludes not only to the use of public force and as a defining element of the authority for the effects of a judgment of guarantees, but tothe nature of the claimed action, as long as this affects the judicial situation of the individual. --- In the contradiction of thesis 29/94, between those asserted by the Ninth Collegial Tribunal and the First, Second, Third, Fifth and Seventh Collegial Tribunal, all in the Field of Work of the First Circuit, the Second Court, in its present entirety considered: ----“SIXTH.- In order to clear up the contradiction of the proposed thesis, it is necessary, firstly, to determine what is an authoritative act   regarding the effects of a judgment of amparo.---Article 103, section I, of the General Constitution, stipulates:--- Article 103. The courts of the Federation will resolve all controversies that arise;--- I. For laws or authoritative acts that violate individual guarantees;--- Identical text is presented in section I of article 1º of the Law of Writs of Relief.--- The Mexican Legal Dictionary of the Institute of Legal Investigations of the Independent National University of Mexico, notes as pertinent:

Authority….III. Jurists understand by “authority”: in the possession of which one finds themselves invested in the faculties or functions or the person or thing that has a right to (or assumes) power, influence or obligation. By extension the expression applies in order to designate those individuals or organs that participate in public Power, named so as the (legitimate) enforcers of Power.---From the foregoing  can be seen the persistent meaning of express authority, firstly, influence, power, bonds; in second place, the manifestation of capability, quality, jurisdiction, performance; and lastly, it refers to those individuals or entities empowered with these faculties or functions. These three descriptive meanings (closely related among themselves) receive the ritual, magical, or ideological burden that surrounds the uses of “authority”. --- The legal meaning relevant to the notion of authority presumes the idea of an investiture (eg. jurisdiction, function).The notion of legal authority turns, as well, around the concept of capacity, which same indicates power or capacity of an individual (or group) to modify the existing legal situation… ---The Organic Law of Federal Public Administration establishes in its articles 1º, 2º, 3º and 45 :---Article 1º. The present law establishes the basis of the organization of federal, public, centralized and semi-official administration. ---“The Presidency of the Republic, the State and Administrative Departments bring together the centralized public administration.---The decentralized organisms, businesses with state participation, national credit institutions, auxiliary national credit organizations, national institutions of insurance, bonds, and trusts, make up the public semi-official administration.”---Article 2º. In the exercising of their powers and in order to dispatch administrative orders to the businesses entrusted to the Executive Branch of the Union, the public centralized administration will be subject to the following::---1. Secretaries of State, and---II. Administrative Departments”…”Article 3º. The Executive power of the Union will give aid, in terms of the corresponding legal requirements, to the following entities of the Semi-OfficialPublic State Administrations:---1. Decentralized organisms---“Article 45. Entities created by law or by decree of the Congress of the Union or by Federal Executive decree are decentralized organs, with their own legal personality and assets, regardless of the legal structure they adopt”.---However, in agreement with the doctrine, the following types of legal relationships exist that derive from proceedings of the State and its organs:---Thecoordinationof relationships are the links for engaging in a variety of lawsuits between two or more physical or moral persons, in their capacity as governed (ones).---The relationsfrom above to subordinate are those that arise between organs of authority, on the one hand, and the governed on the other. In these relations the authority carries out, before the individual, the authoritative proceedings strictly speaking that have characteristics like being one-sided, imperative and coercive. It is said that such actions areone-sided because their existence depends only on the will of the authority¸ they areimperative by virtue (of the fact) they are imposed against the will of the governed, and they arecoercive given that if they are not complied with voluntarily, coercive compliance can be achieved by use of public power.---In other words, qualifying the authoritative action involves a State organ constituted by a person or by a professional body, which executes certain actions in the exercise of legal jurisdiction, actions that modify, create, or wipe out a current de facto situation or a right by means of a decision, with the execution of this decision, of either or both.---With respect to Gabino Fraga it states: “When the powers granted to an organ involve the power of decision and execution, that is to say, the authorization to carry out acts of natural justice that affect the sphere of individuals and that impose their decisions on them, they have the concept of authority…The administrative organs who have a character of authority can concentrate on their powers of decision and execution, and in this case, they are known as executive bodies, but also it could happen that they only have powers of decision and that the execution of their determinations must be carried out by a different organ.”---In addition,for the action of a state organ to be considered as such it must be performed owing to the relationship from above to subordinate; or between subjects placed at different levels, the individuals on one side and the State on the other, invested with its judicial authority.—With regards to the specific case of the Commission for Regularization of Land Tenure, the same is a decentralized public organism of a technical and social nature with a judicial personality and its own assets, which has as its objective to regulate land tenure where irregular (not legally correct) human settlements, in     communal or ejidal properties, exist; to endorse public writings or titles by which the property of the individuals is recognized by virtue of the regularization effected; to formalize agreements necessary to the objective; to guarantee and/or deliver to the corresponding institution the compensations to which the cores of the ejidal or communal populations are entitled, owing to expropriations. Moreover, it is the specific role of the director general to promote before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform the expropriation of ejidal or communal lands which require regularization.---The Organic Law of Federal Public Administration establishes that centralized public administration is formed by State Secretariats and by Administrative Departments and that the semi-official Public State Administration fits in, between others, with the decentralized organisms.---In agreement with the preceding, we have thatthe committee concerned is an integral part of the semi-official public administration, given that it was created by Federal Executive decree like adecentralized organism; so, although it does not form part of Executive Power, it does constitute an auxiliary organ of the same.--- Andrés Serra Rojas defines administrative decentralization in the following terms: “Administrative decentralization is the technique of the judicial organization of a public entity, which integrates a personality to which is assigned a limited territorial jurisdiction or that which partially administrates specific matters, with certain autonomy or independence, without forming part of the State, and to which is not dispensed political regulating Power and administrative responsibility.”---It should be added that this Tribunal in consideration, thatnot all the actions of the indicated commissionare, necessarily, proceedingsof authority for the effects of amparo, butonly those which affect the judicial sphere of the individuals by means of the exercise of Power, whether they do it within the judicial attributes of the authorized dispositions , or outside or them.”--- The expounded foregoing carries to this Full Court interruption of the criteria which appear published with the caption of:“AUTHORITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF AMPARO TRIALS.”, which relies on the base to consider as authority only that person that stipulates public force in virtue of legal or de facto circumstances, then as it has been indicated, said criteria should adjust to the current moment in which it lives, in which the organization and functions of the State have given way to substantial changes which allow the authority to deem independently if it can, or not, use direct public force. --- In this concrete case, a definitive argument has been sustained in a traditional manner that denies the character of authority for the effects of a writ of relief to the universality, their administrative nature of decentralized autonomous organisms, whose essence excludes them from state organization, in such a way they cannot be considered as organs of same and neither their authoritative actions.---Nonetheless, these criteria are now inadmissible for the following reasons:---Article 49 of the General Constitution of the Republic, in its first paragraph, stipulates that:“The Supreme Power of the Federation is divided in order to practice into Legislative, Executive, and Judicial (parts).”This resolution is found picked up in the State Constitutions.---Certainly, with the objective of giving coherence and place to the fulfillment of the administrative function entrusted to the Executive Power, the public administration is essentially organized in two forms: centralized and decentralized. --- Centralized public administration presents as a structure of diverse organs and levels, dependant on each other in a hierarchical relationship presided over by their established chief, on the federal level personified by the president of the Republic, and locally, by the State governors.---Decentralized public administration is expressed in a structure of detached organisms in  diverse degrees of the central administration, those in charge of carrying out assorted administrative service, collaboration, or regional  tasks. In this facet of the State, we also warn state joint venture companies it is worth carrying out intervention activities in the economy of the country directly; both classes of entities shape the call of semi-official state administration.---In this order of ideas,decentralized organisms do not form part of the Executive Power, while they are components of the public administration, and their general objective is auxiliary in the exercise of their responsibilities and for the office of matters of administrative affairs.---Their specific objectives are diverse. So, on the federal level,  we warn that article 14 of the Federal Law of Semi-Official State Entities establishes that:---“Decentralized organisms are legal persons created in conformance with that put down by the Organic Law of Federal Public Administration and whose objective is: I. Performance of activities corresponding to strategic or high-priority areas; II. Provision of a public or social service; or III. Obtaining or applying resources for the purposes of assistance or social security.”---In these conditions, these entities are made up like entities created by law or decree by the head of the Executive Power, with legal personality and their own assets. In the federal order, the Organic law of Federal Public Administration, in article 45, determines that:”Decentralized organisms are entities created by law or Executive Federal decree, with legal personality and their own assets, in whatever legal structure they adopt.”.----This granting of personality and their own assets to the organisms under our discussion, as generally accepted in the doctrine, obeys the need to give them, whether it be a simple technical autonomy or a truly organic autonomy, or both, in order to fulfill their assigned duties.---Technical autonomy implies no submission of these organisms to the administrative and financial management rules generally applicable to all the centralized State services.--- Organic autonomy is expressed in the special internal organization of the organism that is allows inclusion even in an extreme case of self-government.---Under this vision,it is  therefore an administration within the framework of the law, restricted to the execution of the specified purposes entrusted to the said organisms.---That is, decentralized organisms reflect a form of State administrative organization, not unrelated to this, that presents an autonomy for management purposes to achieve an efficient and effective development of the functions entrusted to them, therefore the statement is not admissible in the sense that they are not part of the State.---What actually occurs, in the terms stated in the doctrine, is an involvement on the part of the State in a portion of its assets which remain being its property, the needs of the service provided, limiting as well the responsibility of the State itself to the person who constitutes the proprietorship especially affected, and although such organisms work in their own name, this implies that they act in the name and on behalf of a special State asset as opposed to the concept of its general assets, and that the public entity has willingly endowed it (with) autonomy.---In this circumstance, one cannot admit the argument that flatly denies the character of authority for the proposes ofamparo    proceedings to all public entities, consistent with dealings of decentralized autonomous organisms that do not form part of the State, because precisely, being decentralized organisms, they are only a formula of public administration organization that gives a disentailment to the said entities in varying degrees with respect to the hierarchal  relationship  of the centralized organization, however,they cannot be considered outside the State  but only within it, and only for efficient and special reasons,  in the provision of  of the service with which they are entrusted, are they granted a technical or fully organic autonomy, or both, but limited and subject to judicial orders and their own purposes. ---So, universally, like decentralized organisms they are public entities that form part of the public administration and, therefore, of the State, and even though they have a special autonomy that implies self-regulation and self-government, such circumstance requires they serve the need to achieve the best efficiency in provision of the service attributed to them and that is based on the freedom of example, butdoes not imply in any way the disintegration of the state structure, since it is exercised within the framework of principles and rules predetermined by its own State, and restricted to its purposes, by that which is not constituted as an obstacle that impedes the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers to assure the regular and efficient function of the service example.---For this reason, it is held that it cannot, under the examined arguments, admit the absolute and general denial of the authoritative character of of this institution, and on the contrary, it affirms that it should deal with the concrete case and analyze if such entities, founded in a law of public origin, can exercise a legal power of a sort that affects in and of itself the judicial sphere of individuals in a unilateral manner, with the independence that they can, or not, make direct use of public force.

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Based on that shown by the higher court, the characteristics of an action, in a relationship from above to subordinate, in order to be considered as originating from an authority  regarding the effects of anamparoare:

a. The existence of a body of fact or of law that establishes a superior to subordinate relationship with an individual, in whose assumption acts with the issuance of a unilateral, imperative, or coercive action.

b.)  This relationship will have its origin in law, the same which bestows on the entity an administrative power that may not be waived due to the public nature of the source of this power.

c.)  Owing to this relationship, it issues unilateral actions through which it effects judicial force over the governed, because it believes in, modifies or extinguishes a legal situation.

d.)  For the issuance of these actions, it will not be required to turn to judicial organs, nor to the specific will of the affected (person).

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So, in order to determine if in this present case it is in the presence of an authoritative action, the judicial relationship between the governed and the entity will have to be due to  that of  superior to subordinate, which consists of that established between governors and governed, where the former act on a superior plane relative to the latter, nonetheless to the benefit of public order or social interest.

These relationships are regulated by public law and in turn establish the procedures intended to resolve questions raised by the action of government entities, in addition to regulating challenge mechanisms in order to safeguard the legality and constitutionality of the same.

Also, it is cited that these relationships are characterized by their unilaterality, by means of which the Constitution establishes a series of individual guarantees with limitations to the act of ruling, because the State organ imposes its will without the need to turn to the courts.

Therefore, as it was laid down, the following are requirements to the relationship of superior to subordinate:

1.)  Unilateral. For its existence and effectiveness it does not require cooperation or collaboration of the individual opposing this exercise, that is to say, its existence depends only on the will of the authority

2.) Imperative.  It subordinates the will of the said individual, as the will of this is subjugated to that stipulated by the entity, or the procedure is imposed even though it is against the will of the governed.

3.)  Coercive.  It can restrict or force the governed to respect the will of the authority, that is, if the action does not comply with a voluntary form it can be achieved in a coercive manner through means of public force.

In that circumstance, no action coming from authority is susceptible to being claimed against inamparo proceedings, but only that which affects abstract judicial (legal) situations or specific individual effects (action in the strict sense), chargeable to a State organ and imposed on the governed in such a way that the characteristics are evidenced as previously described.

Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the nature of the action in order to determine if it is derived, or not, from an authority over the effects ofamparo.

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The exhibited considerations allow us to maintain that the civil association is not a decentralized institution owing to its judicial nature, and the fact that the municipalities have not required that for delivery of the powers to provide public municipal services, in no way credits the authoritative action for the effects ofamparo, as well as not evidencing legal characteristics in order to be considered as such, in spite of the declaration that exists in the justified report that demonstrates the existence of the claimed actions, since this expression only proves they performed the actions in response to the non-compliance of payment obligations  by the member plaintiff, and, for the same reason, their action cannot be considered as that of a decentralized public institution.

In accordance with that exhibited, it is noteworthy that the legal figure of the association was foreseen in the Civil Code of the State of Jalisco and said codification constitutes the legal base of the constitution of merit, to the extent that it obeys the agreement of the will of its members stated in the formalized contract before a notary public, the foregoing without being subject to modify its statutes and internal resolutions in order to adapt its operation to actual needs, as can be seen from the transcribed public writings.

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By way of the (foregoing) exhibited and well-founded, it is resolved:

SOLELY: ToDISMISS the writ of relief (amparo)582/2013demanded  byPAUL EAST, against the claimed actions of the responsible authorities of the Municipal Government, Municipal President, and the official in Charge of the Secretaria, all of the Constitutional Government of Chapala, Jalisco,  and the Assoc….Chula Vista..A.C…, for the reasons set down in the third and final consideration of this resolution.

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PLEASE NOTE:  For purposes of brevity, certain words likeamparo, colonia, etc.have been retained in Spanish once they have been translated a couple of times. Similarly, I have omitted the full and complete title of “Associación de Colonos de Chula Vista A.C..” every place it appears since it is obvious from the text as shown.